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In standard models of experimentation, the costs of project development consist of (i) the
direct cost of running trials as well as (ii) the implicit opportunity cost of leaving alternative
projects idle. Another natural type of experimentation cost, the cost of holding on to the
option of developing a currently inactive project, has not been studied. In a (multi-armed
bandit) model of experimentation in which inactive projects have explicit maintenance costs
and can be irreversibly discarded, I fully characterise the optimal experimentation policy
and show that the decision-maker's incentive to actively manage its options has important
implications for the order of project development. In the model, an experimenter searches
for a success among a number of projects by choosing both those to develop now and those
to maintain for (potential) future development. In the absence of maintenance costs, the
optimal experimentation policy has a `stay-with-the-winner' property: the projects that are
more likely to succeed are developed rst. Maintenance costs provide incentives to bring the
option value of less promising projects forward, and under the optimal experimentation policy,
projects that are less likely to succeed are sometimes developed rst. A project development
strategy of `going-with-the-loser' strikes a balance between the cost of discarding possibly
valuable options and the cost of leaving them open.
1 Introduction
When experimentation is costly, decision-makers must choose which alternatives to actively inves-
tigate and which to leave `on the back burner'. Consider, for example, a rm engaged in research
and development facing many technologies that can lead to comparable innovations. Investing
in multiple technologies simultaneously is costly, so the rm prioritises its allocation of funds to
competing ideas. A massive number of books and business articles on project management help
managers decide which technologies to develop and, more importantly, whether/when to trans-
fer resources to other projects following disappointing results in priority projects. As another
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1example, professional sports teams' in-game roster management decisions stem from exogenous
restrictions on their ability to learn about multiple players at once. A single player can play at
a given position at any given time during a game and coaches/managers can gather information
about their players' abilities only by having them replace a teammate.
In standard models of experimentation, the choice of gathering information about one alter-
native as opposed to another entails only an implicit opportunity cost: the foregone opportunity
of learning about the inactive alternative. However, retaining the option to investigate a cur-
rently shelved alternative often involves explicit maintenance costs. Firms engaged in research
and development routinely devote resources solely to keep open the option of developing a tech-
nology that is currently `on the back burner', which involves the costly upkeep of specialised
equipment and paying the salaries of skilled workers or scientists that can be lost to other rms.
In professional sports, the option to develop players of unknown quality is kept open by lling
roster spots with `bench' players, who may seldom get the opportunity to play but command
millions of dollars' worth of salaries.
In this paper, I present a simple (multi-armed bandit) model of experimentation in which
projects (arms) that are not being developed (pulled) have explicit maintenance costs. The
experimenter is thus led to actively manage its set of options, as it faces a choice between paying
to keep some options open or discarding them (irreversibly) altogether. Discarding an inactive
project liquidates its option value, which is realised in the event that currently active projects are
deemed unpromising. To avoid both destroying this option value and paying to maintain it, the
experimenter has an incentive to bring it forward by altering the order of project development.
In a tractable setup in which two risky projects can be either good or bad and only good
projects eventually succeed if developed, I fully characterise the optimal experimentation policy
with maintenance costs and show that it entails signicant departures from standard results.
In the absence of maintenance costs, the optimal experimentation policy has the well-known
`stay-with-the-winner' property: the project that is more likely to succeed is investigated rst.1
In the presence of maintenance costs, `going-with-the-loser' can be optimal: projects less likely
to succeed may be investigated rst. When `going-with-the-loser', the experimenter brings the
option value of `losing' projects forward through a simple culling rule. Such projects are granted
a `last chance' to succeed through a short and intense period of experimentation, after which
they are permanently discarded in favour of more promising projects.
While the idea of maintenance costs is natural and widely applicable, one way to interpret
these results is as providing some rational foundations for the behaviour described as `throwing
good money after bad' or escalation, in which decision-makers fail to `know when to pull the
plug' and appear to cling to projects that have repeatedly failed to achieve results.2 Common
explanations have revolved around decision-makers falling prey to some form of sunk cost fal-
1The term `stay-with-the-winner' is coined by Berry and Fristedt (1985).
2See Staw (1981), Staw and Ross (1987) and Garland (1990).
2lacy. However, it need not be the case that observing an intensied commitment to a given
project following a failure is the result only of non-rational behaviour.3 Indeed, in my model,
the experimenter throws good money after bad precisely in order to convince itself that the ini-
tial investments were indeed a bad idea, thus ensuring a quicker extrication of resources from a
hopeless project towards more promising ones.
The following example illustrates the main lessons of the paper by clarifying why experiment-
ing with the `losing' project rst can be optimal when maintaining inactive projects is costly.
An experimenter can devote a trial to one of two projects, A and B, in each of three periods.
Projects are risky in that the payos they deliver are unknown. A project of type Good delivers
a one-time payo of 1 with probability G > 0 in any trial. Assume that experimentation ends
once a single trial is successful. Direct experimentation costs are k > 0 per trial, maintenance
costs for an unused project are k  0 per period and there is no discounting.
A project's current state is characterised by the experimenter's belief that it is of type Good
and repeated failures make the experimenter more pessimistic about the project. Let pi
J be the
probability that project J is of type Good given that it has failed i trials, with i 2 f0;1;2g.
By Bayes' rule, pi
J =
pi 1(1 G)
1 pi 1G for i = f1;2g, and initial beliefs (p0
A;p0




A]. This ensures that project A is the better project ex ante and that in the
absence of maintenance costs, that is if k = 0, the optimal experimentation sequence must develop
project A twice and project B once. While all such experimentation sequences generate the same
probability of a success, the `go-with-the-winner' sequence AAB yields the highest payo as it
maximises the probability that a success arrives early and avoids further experimentation costs.
When k > 0, it is straightforward to show that the optimal experimentation sequence will
always be one of AAjAB, jBAAA or BjBAA, where jJ represents the discarding of project J.
That is, either the experimenter sticks with the `go-with-the-winner' rule, abandons the `losing'
project B immediately or it gives project B an early chance to succeed and discards it following
a failure. Let V (s;p0
A;p0
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3In the management literature, Bowen (1987) has related misgivings about such interpretations of escalation
behaviour. See also McAfee et al. (2010).
3The incentive to bring the option value of project B forward entails a trade-o. The benets of
experimentation sequence BjBAA are that (i) (relative to sequence jBAAA) the value of project
B gets exploited and the decision to discard B is better informed while (ii) (relative to sequence
AAjAB) saving on maintenance costs. However, to the experimentation sequence BjBAA are
associated both (i) the maintenance cost (relative to jBAAA) and (ii) the opportunity cost
(relative to AAjAB) of leaving the `better' project A idle while experimenting with project B.
Simple calculations show that V (AAjAB;p0
A;p0
B)   V (BjBAA;p0
A;p0
B) is decreasing in p0
B.
Hence, if BjBAA is preferred to AAjAB for some p0
B 2 [p1
A;p2
A], then this is also the case for all
p00
B > p0
B. Note also that V (jBAAA;p0
A;p0
B) is independent of p0







B)g is decreasing in p0
B and is strictly positive at p0
B =
p1
A. That is, when p0
B = p1
A, all three experimentation sequences AAjAB, BjBAA and jBAAA
yield the same success probabilities, yet jBAAA has strictly lower costs. Hence, for xed G, k,
k and p0
A, the optimal experimentation policy can be represented by beliefs p, p with p2
A  p 
p  p1
A, such that jBAAA is optimal on [p2
A;p], AAjAB is optimal on [p;p] and BjBAA is optimal
on [p;p1
A]. In general, all three intervals can be non-empty. An example has G = 2





100. Then it can be computed that p1
A  0:33 and p2
A  :23, while p  0:32
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Figure 1: Example: Optimal Experimentation as a function of p0
B.
I model experimentation as a multi-armed bandit problem.4 In the standard discounted
4See Berry and Fristedt (1985). Bergemann and V alim aki (2006) survey the bandits literature with an eye to
applications in economics.
4bandit problem with independent arms, the optimal experimentation policy is the well-known
(Gittins) index policy,5 which is not robust to perturbations of the model such as correlated
arms, non-geometric discounting and the simultaneous pulling of multiple arms. Much less is
known about optimal experimentation policies when these do not take the simple index form.
Closer to this paper, Banks and Sundaram (1994) have shown that index policies are not optimal
in the presence of switching costs between arms.6 Switching costs are attributed to an inactive
arm only when experimentation transitions to it and are always accompanied by an observation
from that arm. Maintenance costs, on the other hand, need to be paid whenever an inactive arm
is not pulled and never generate observations from that arm. Nevertheless, the bandit problem
with maintenance costs fails to admit a Gittins index representation for the reason found by
Banks and Sundaram (1994): the index of a given maintained arm would have to be a function
of the maintenance cost, and this relationship would depend nontrivially on the characteristics
of outside arms.7
I adopt the exponential bandit framework due to Keller et al. (2005), which yields a continuous
time innite horizon version of the model in the example from above. Exponential bandits have
proved useful in applications due to their tractability. Keller et al. (2005), following Bolton and
Harris (1999), study strategic experimentation and the free-riding incentives of multiple agents
facing a single risky arm. Keller and Rady (2009) generalise the model to `poisson' bandits
that allow for arms of the bad type to also generate successes. Klein and Rady (2008) allow
for each of two experimenters to have perfectly negatively correlated versions of the same risky
arm. Strulovici (2009) applies the model in a voting framework. Bergemann and Hege (1998)
introduce a discrete-time version of the model to study the moral hazard problem arising between
bankers (principal) and venture capitalists (experimenters). In this vein, recent papers by Bonatti
and H orner (2009) and H orner and Samuelson (2009) focus on the provision of incentives to
experimenting agents. Bonatti and H orner (2009) derive another version of the `stay-with-the-
winner' rule when agents can experiment with multiple disjunctive projects, i.e., when only a
single project success is required. They also uncover a `go-with-the-loser' rule when projects are
conjunctive, i.e., when success on both projects is required. In that case, experimenting rst with
the losing project is optimal since a success on the winning project is worthless on its own. My
results show that with maintenance costs to inactive projects, `going-with-the-loser' is optimal
even with disjunctive projects.
In Section 2, I describe the model. In Section 2.1, I extend the standard expressions for
5To each arm is assigned a number (index) that depends only on the ex ante characteristics and accumulated
observations of that project. The optimal experimentation policy consists of always selecting a project among
those with maximal indices.
6General characterisations of optimal experimentation policies with switching costs have proven dicult to
obtain. For details, see Jun (2004). An exception is Bergemann and V alim aki (2001), who exploit results of Banks
and Sundaram (1992b) on bandits with a countable numbers of ex ante identical arms to show that an experimenter
never switches back to an arm it switched away from earlier.
7It is not clear how to dene an index policy in the presence of maintenance costs since experimentation policies
need to specify both which arm is pulled and which arms are maintained.
5the experimenter's optimal payos in the continuous-time exponential two-armed (optimal stop-
ping) bandit problem to the case with two risky projects. In Section 3, I characterise optimal
experimentation in a benchmark model in which inactive projects have maintenance costs but
the experimenter cannot discard risky projects individually. This is equivalent to a standard
three-armed bandit with two risky arms and no maintenance costs, and I show that the optimal
(Gittins index) experimentation policy involves the `stay-with-the-winner' rule. That is, condi-
tional on continued experimentation, it is optimal to select the project most likely to succeed. In
Section 4, I present the main results of the paper for the model in which inactive projects have
maintenance costs and the experimenter can discard individual projects. First, I show that if the
optimal policy ever `goes-with-the-loser', it will do so in a very specic way, notably through a
culling rule. The losing project will be chosen continuously for a short period, after which, in the
absence of a success, it will be discarded. In other words, losing projects are put to trial before
winning projects only if they are being granted a `last chance' to succeed, else, as in the example,
they are either maintained but not put to trial or simply discarded. Second, I give a complete
characterisation of the optimal policy and show that `going-with-the-loser' is a robust feature
of optimal experimentation with maintenance costs. More precisely, whenever it is not the case
that maintenance costs are high enough that the losing project is always discarded immediately,
it will be put to trial before the winning arm in non-negligible regions of the belief space.
In Section 5, I show that my results can be extended in two natural directions. First, in
the case in which the experimenter has more than two risky projects, the culling rule for losing
projects takes a more general form. When the experimenter has three risky projects ranked by
their likelihoods of success,8 I show that if it is ever optimal to experiment with the middle-ranked
project, then experimentation can proceed to the top-ranked project only when both the middle-
ranked and the lowest-ranked projects have been discarded. In other words, experimenting with
a middle-ranked project grants a `last chance' to all projects of a lower or equal rank. Second,
I show that `going-with-the-loser' is still optimal if successes on various projects are not perfect
substitutes but can be accumulated.9 Hence, my results are due to the incentive to economise
on maintenance costs by bringing the option values of inactive projects forward, and not to the
fact that a leftover project is rendered valueless by another project's success.
2 Model
Consider a continuous time three-armed bandit problem with two risky arms, A and B, and a
safe arm S. Arms will henceforth be referred to as projects. A trial consists of experimenting
with a risky project for some time interval [t;t+dt]. Trials yield either successes or failures. The
type of a risky project is  2 fGood;Badg. A risky project of type  that is pulled continuously
8The argument is easily extended to more than three projects.
9This corresponds to the distinction between disjunctive and additive projects in the language of Bonatti and
H orner (2009).
6in time interval [t;t+dt] succeeds with probability Gdt for some G > 0 if  = Good, while it fails
for sure if  = Bad. The types of risky projects A and B are drawn independently. Let pJ(0) be
the ex ante probability that project J is of type Good. A safe project S yields a ow payo of 0.
A success on either risky project yields a lump-sum payment of 1 and ends the experimentation
process.
Experimenting continuously with risky project J in time interval [t;t+dt] entails experimen-
tation cost kdt. I introduce explicit costs to maintaining inactive risky projects. That is, a risky
project that is maintained but not involved in a trial in time interval [t;t + dt] entails a cost of
kdt. The experimenter can irreversibly discard risky projects without cost. That is, it can avoid
paying for the maintenance of inactive projects but only at the cost of permanently abandoning
some of its options. There are no costs to the safe project, which can be interpreted as an option
to quit the experimentation process. The experimenter discounts future payos at rate r.
Since experimentation ends after the rst success, the only histories after which the exper-
imenter selects a project to experiment with are intervals of time in which only failures have
been observed. Strategies should properly be dened on histories. However, any such strategy
can be redened to depend solely on time in the absence of a success. A strategy is a collection
(;A;B) for some function  : R+ ! [0;1] [ fSg and decreasing functions J : R+ ! f0;1g
for J 2 fA;Bg. The function  is an assignment rule and
R t+dt
t (t) species the fraction of time
devoted to experimenting with projects A in time interval [t;t+dt] if the experimenter conducts
trials in that interval, while (t) = S if the experimenter pulls the safe project at time t. The
principal is allowed to share the responsibility for the project between the agents in any interval
of time. The assumption that the experimenter cannot share the assignment between all three
projects and must decide rst whether to conduct trials and then how to share experimentation
between risky projects is made to simplify the exposition and is in fact without loss of generality
for optimal experimentation. Functions A and B specify maintenance rules, with J(t) = 1
if and only if J is maintained at time t. Strategy (;A;B) is admissible if each component is
right-continuous and piecewise Lipschitz continuous. Let tJ 2 [0;1) = supft : J(t) = 1g. Given
any initial beliefs (pA(0);pB(0)) 2 [0;1]2, an admissible strategy (;A;B) induces a uniquely
dened and continuously dierentiable laws of motion for beliefs (pA(t);pB(t)). These laws of





 (t)GpA(t)(1   pA(t)) for t 2 [0;tA),





 (1   (t))GpB(t)(1   pB(t)) for t 2 [0;tB),
0 for t  tB,
are derived in a straightforward way by requiring that the evolution of beliefs be consistent with
 and Bayes' rule, and follows Keller et al. (2005).
7For much of the paper, it will be more convenient to work with Markov strategies, which are
conditioned on the state variable, which is the current beliefs along with the set of maintained
projects. Using dynamic programming methods allows for simple expressions for optimal payos.
However, many of the arguments regarding when and why maintained projects should be dis-
carded are naturally established by considering time paths of play. More formally, a state consists
of (pA;pB;IA;IB) 2 [0;1]2  f0;1g2. A Markov assignment is a function  : [0;1]2  f0;1g2 !
[0;1][fSg. Markov maintenance rules are functions 'J : [0;1]2f0;1g2 ! f0;1g for J 2 fA;Bg
such that 'J(pA;pB;IA;IB) = 0 whenever IJ = 0.
Imposing admissibility requirements directly on Markov strategies is cumbersome.10 A further
diculty in my framework is to determine how the monotonicity (irreversibility) requirements on
maintenance rules carry over to restrictions on Markov maintenance rules. To get around these
issues, I rely on the admissibility requirement already stated for strategies. Markov strategy
(;'A;'B) will be said to be admissible if given any state (pA;pB;IA;IB) and initial beliefs





Henceforth I will not explicitly restrict the experimenter to using admissible Markov strategies,
but I will verify that the optimal Markov strategies I derive, as well as the deviating strategies
that support various proofs, are admissible.





1   (pA;pB;IA;IB) if (pA;pB;IA;IB) 6= S,
S if (pA;pB;IA;IB) = S,
'J(pB;pA;IB;IA) = ' J(pA;pB;IA;IB) for J 2 fA;Bg.
Given any optimal strategy (;'), there exists an optimal symmetric strategy that achieves
the same payos. Hence, restricting to symmetric strategies is without loss of generality for
the experimenter's payos. Given the restriction to symmetric strategies, it is without loss of
generality to assume that pA  pB. Henceforth, project A will always be the `winning' project,
with project B the `losing' project.
Let W(;;t;) be the experimenter's payo at time t to strategy (;) if a success arrives
at time  < minftA;tBg




10See Fleming and Rishel (1975), Theorem 6.1.
8while if a success arrives at  2 [minftA;tBg;maxftA;tBg]
W(;;t;) = e r  
Z minftA;tBg
t












The expected payo to strategy (;) given belief (pA(0);pB(0)) is
V (;;t)  EW(;;t;);
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of stopping times  determined by (;) and
(pA(s);pB(s))t. Consider an admissible Markov strategy (;') and its corresponding strategy
(;) for some state (p;I). The expected payo to (;') in state (p;I) is given by
v(;';p;I)  V (;;0)
The objective of the experimenter is to nd a payo-maximising strategy. To this end, let
U(t) = max(;) V (;;t). Similarly, let u(p;I) = max(;') v(;';p;I).
2.1 Preliminaries: Optimal Payo Functions
Keller et al. (2005) provide simple expressions for optimal value functions for the two-armed
exponential bandit (optimal stopping) problem. In this section, I build on these results to derive
the expressions satised by the optimal payo u that will support the characterisations of Sections
3 and 4. To simplify notation, let the number of beliefs listed in a state implicitly denote the set
of maintained projects. Hence (pA;pB) stands for state (pA;pB;1;1), (pA) for state (pA;pB;1;0)
given any pB, and so on.
The optimal payo u must satisfy the following Bellman equation
u(pA;pB) = max
(
e rdtu(pA;pB); uA(pA); uB(pB); max
2[0;1]
n
[pAG + (1   )pBG




The rst term in the brackets of (1) corresponds to the option of employing the safe project in
a time interval of length dt. The second and third terms correspond to the options of discarding
projects A and B respectively, where uJ corresponds to the optimal payo to the two-armed
9bandit problem with risky project J and the safe project. The nal term corresponds to the
payo from maintaining both projects and allocating the experimentation eort optimally.
When a risky project has been discarded, the payo uJ solves
uJ(pJ) = max
(
e rdtuJ(pJ); [pJG   k]dt + e rdtE[uJ(pJ + dpJ)jpJ]
)
:
The probability of a success in an interval of length dt is pJGdt, and the payo to a success is
1. The probability of failure is 1   pJGdt. In case of failure, the payo to the experimenter is
uJ(pJ)+u0
J(pJ)dpJ, which is equal to u(pJ) u0




0;pJG   k   u0
J(pJ)GpJ(1   pJ)   uJ(pJ)GpJ
)
:
Hence, in an open region of beliefs in which project J is used, uJ satises the dierential equation
uJ(pJ)(r + GpJ) = pJG   k   u0
J(pJ)GpJ(1   pJ); (2)
which can be solved to yield






(1   pJ) + pJ
G   k
r + G










r(r+G) and the stopping belief p
J = k
G determined
by value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
uJ(p




The setup here is slightly dierent than in Keller et al. (2005), but the expression (3) admits
the same interpretation. The term pJ
G k
r+G   (1   pJ)k
r is the payo to risky project J in the





G (1 pJ) captures the
option value of the quitting option S.
Note that the part of value function (1) in which both projects are maintained is linear in .
Hence, in an open region of the state space in which both projects are maintained, the optimal
value is attained for  2 f0;1g, and (1) can be rewritten as
ru(pA;pB) = max
(
pAG   (k + k)  
@u(pA;pB)
@pA
GpA(1   pA)   u(pA;pB)GpA;
pBG   (k + k)  
@u(pA;pB)
@pB
GpB(1   pB)   u(pA;pB)GpB
)
: (4)
10Contrary to (2), partial dierential equation (4) does not have a simple solution, since such a
solution must include an optimal rule for the allocation of trials among projects.
I approach the solution to (4) by abstracting from allocation rules in order to reduce the
two-dimensional problem (4) to suitably dened single-dimensional problems. First consider an
open region of the state space in which project A is put to trial but both projects are maintained.
Then since the optimal Markov strategy is admissible there exists t0 > 0 and a parametrised path
(pA(t);pB) such that U(t) = u(pA(t);pB) for t 2 (0;t0). An argument similar to that establishing
(2) shows that U(t) satises
U(t)[r + pA(t)G]   U0(t) = pA(t)G   (k + k): (5)
For path (pA(t);pB), dene uA(pA(t);pB)  U(t). Then U0(t) =  u0
A(pA(t);pB)GpA(t)(1  
pA(t)), which uses the law of motion for pA. Condition (5) can be rewritten, eliminating the
dependence on time, as
uA(pA;pB)[r + pAG] + u0
A(pA;pB)GpA(1   pA) = pAG   (k + k): (6)







(1   pA) + pA
G   (k + k)
r + G




In (7), the constant of integration, and hence the option value of project B, will in general depend
on pB, since pB can aect the payos when exiting the A-assignment region. If the parametrised
path (pA(t);pB) exits the A-assignment region in state (p
A;pB), then p
A and CA(pB) satisfy the













A;pB) is endogenous and depends on the experimentation policy once exit from
the A-region occurs. If, for example, experimentation exits the A-region into the quitting region
at p
A, then u(p
A;pB) = 0 and @
@pAu(p




Equation (7) establishes a useful necessary condition for optimal payos: when project A is
put to trial in the optimal solution, payos evolve as though the experimenter was facing an
optimal stopping problem with cost k + k for the risky project, with the value to the stopping
region adjusted to incorporate continuation payos. It will be useful in the sequel to distinguish
a payo of the form (7) from the optimal payo u(pA;pB) in an A-assignment region. Given
(pA;pB) and some function CA(pB), dene the righthand side of (7) as vA(pA;CA(pB)).
113 Benchmark: Staying-With-The-Winner
To highlight the impact of maintenance costs on optimal experimentation, a useful benchmark
is the case in which risky projects cannot be discarded individually. In this problem, the experi-
menter can only coarsely manage its options: it can either experiment at the cost of maintaining
both projects, or quit experimentation by moving to the safe project and discarding both risky
projects. To this end, suppose that the experimenter is restricted to Markov strategies with
'(p;I) = (1;1) for all states (p;I) such that (p;I) 6= S. Note that this problem is equivalent to
the standard three-armed bandit problem with direct experimentation ow cost (k + k).
Conditional on continuing experimentation, how should the experimenter allocate trials be-
tween risky projects? The next lemma shows that the experimenter should always put the project
with the highest belief to trial, that is, it should follow a `stay-with-the-winner' rule. When beliefs
are such that pA > pB, this means using project A. When beliefs are such that pA = pB, then
both projects are `winning' and `staying-with-the-winner' entails sharing experimentation inten-
sity equally between them. Let (
ND;'
ND) denote an optimal Markov strategy when projects
cannot be discarded individually.
Lemma 1. Consider (pA(0);pB(0)) and the belief path (pA(t);pB(t))t under optimal experimen-
tation. If pA(0) > pB(0), then 
ND(pA(t);pB(t)) 2 f1;Sg for almost all t 2 [0;^ t), where ^ t is such




Lemma 1 mimics the Gittins index representation of the optimal experimentation policy, in
which a project's belief is taken to be the index.12 In fact, the proof of Lemma 1 is essentially a
simplied version of the original `interchange argument' in Gittins and Jones (1974) and Gittins
(1979) that establishes the optimality of the Gittins index for standard bandit problems.13 Start-
ing with an assignment in which a project with a non-maximal Gittins index is chosen before
the project with the maximal index, the argument shows that interchanging the order in which
both projects are pulled, keeping expected continuations following these (random) periods of
experimentation xed, increases the experimenter's payos.
To fully characterise an optimal experimentation strategy, Lemma 1 needs to be augmented
with optimal quitting beliefs, at which all trials cease. The next result addresses this.
Proposition 1. When projects cannot be discarded, the following admissible Markov strategy is
11All proofs are in the Appendix.
12A special feature of exponential bandits is that the project with the highest Gittins index is also the project
with the highest belief, and hence the myopically optimal allocation is also dynamically optimal. This was rst
shown for discrete time Bernoulli bandits by Berry and Fristedt (1985). Their result was generalised in Banks and
Sundaram (1992a), who show that dynamically optimal play is myopic for a class of two-type symmetric bandits.











2 if pA = pB >
k+k
G ,








(1;1) if pA >
k+k
G .
(0;0) if pA 
k+k
G .
Continuing experimentation is optimal as long as one project's belief is above cuto
k+k
G .









B, only project A will ever be put to trial, until belief
(
k+k
G ;pB). For these beliefs, optimal payos have been derived in (3) (for the case of k =
0), and the optimal quitting belief follows from smooth-pasting and value-matching conditions.
From belief (pA;pB) with pA > pB >
k+k
G , experimenting with project A followed by shared




G ) is optimal. For these beliefs, Lemma 1 implies that
experimentation will cease following shared experimentation. In the Appendix, I derive optimal
payos under shared experimentation, which take a form similar to (3). The key is to note that
under shared experimentation with common belief pA = pB = p, the partial dierential equation
(4) can be represented as a dierential equation depending only on p.
4 Optimal Experimentation with Maintenance Costs
This section allows the experimenter to discard individual projects and presents the main re-
sults of the paper. When facing maintenance costs, the experimenter must balance the funding
of more promising projects against the costly management of its future research options. By
discarding inactive projects, the experimenter can avoid accumulating maintenance costs. How-
ever, discarding an inactive project carries an opportunity cost, since it entails the irreversible
abandonment of an option value. This tension generates an incentive to bring the option value
of inactive projects forward.
4.1 When to `Go-with-the-Loser': A Culling Rule
As a rst step, I provide necessary conditions for the losing project B to be put to trial under
optimal experimentation. These show that the patterns of optimal experimentation when projects
can be discarded are simple, in that (i) if a project is ever discarded it is the losing project B,
and (ii) it is discarded as soon as the experimenter no longer intends to put it to trial, while (iii)
































Figure 2: Optimal Experimentation Without Discarding of projects.
that project B is the only project on trial and that project A is eventually put to trial only after
project B has been discarded following repeated failures. In other words, (i) and (ii) state that
there is no value in `stringing' B along without experimenting with it, only to discard is later.
Furthermore, to bring the option value of the losing project B forward, the experimenter must
put it to trial before it would have done so in the absence of maintenance costs, i.e., when it is
still the losing project. Property (iii) establishes that experimentation with a losing project must
take the form of a simple but powerful culling rule: a losing project can be given priority only
in the form of a `last chance' to produce a success. Continued failure in this period of reprieve
leads to the abandonment of the project. Let (;) denote an optimal Markov strategy.
Lemma 2. Consider (pA(0);pB(0)) and the belief path (pA(t);pB(t))t under optimal experimen-
tation.
i. Suppose there exist ^ t and  > 0 such that '(pA(t);pB(t)) 6= (1;1) for all t 2 [^ t;^ t + )
and (pA(t);pB(t)) 6= S for almost all t 2 [^ t;^ t + ). Then, without loss of generality,
'(pA(t);pB(t)) = (1;0) for all t 2 [^ t;^ t + ).
ii. Suppose there exists ^ t such that (pA(t);pB(t)) = 1 for all t 2 [0;^ t) and that there exists
t0 < ^ t such that '(pA(t);pB(t)) = (1;1) for almost all t 2 [0;t0). Then '(pA(t);pB(t)) =
(1;1) for all t 2 [t0;^ t).
iii. Suppose that pA(0) > pB(0) and that there exists ^ t > 0 such that (pA(t);pB(t)) 6= 1 for
14almost all t 2 [0;^ t) and '(pA(t);pB(t)) = (1;1) for all t 2 [0;^ t). Then there exists t such
that ^ t  t, (pA(t);pB(t)) = 0 for almost all t 2 [0;t), '(pA(t);pB(t)) = (1;1) for all
t 2 [0;t) and '(pA(t);pB(t)) = (1;0).
Proving parts i and ii of Lemma 2 is simple. If the better project A were discarded before
B, and B was used after having discarded A, then inverting the roles of projects A and B would
increase the experimenter's payo. If, on the other hand, project B were maintained but never
used again, were project B to be discarded immediately, discoveries would occur with the same
probability and maintenance costs would be avoided for a random time of positive expected
length. The proof of part iii of Lemma 2 relies on Lemma 1, which shows that if both projects
are maintained, optimal experimentation requires that the better project be used. Hence, any
period of experimentation in which project B is used and project A is maintained must end by
project B being discarded.
4.2 When to End a Culling Period: the Discarding Boundary
In this section, I focus on the experimenter's decision to discard project B following a culling
period of experimentation. To this end, suppose that pA > pB and that (pA;pB) lies in an open
region of beliefs in which project B is put to trial. Then, since by Lemma 2 project B is given
its `last chance', it will be discarded in the event of failure at some belief p
B. As was shown in
Section 2.1, the experimenter's payo at (pA;pB) satises
u(pA;pB) = vB(pB;CB(pA));
for some constant of integration CB(pA). The experimenter's payo at belief (pA;p
B) once project
B has been discarded is given by uA(pA) and is independent of pB. Hence value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions at the discarding belief (pA;p
B) yield
vB(p


































15Equation (10) denes the discarding boundary. It does not determine whether project B is
actually ever used when pA > pB, just when it should be discarded were it to be used. Note that
the right-hand side in (10) is the payo to a project that is known to be of type Good but has a
success rate p
BG and associated experimentation cost k + k. Hence (10) states that at a cuto
belief (pA;p
B) at which project B is discarded, the experimenter is indierent between its payo
to project A in the absence of project B and a riskless project with a payo equal to project B's
ow payo at the belief p
B at which it is discarded.
Note that (10) also implies that given project A with belief pA, there is a unique candidate
cuto state (pA;p
B) at which project B is discarded. Hence, dene mapping p
B : [0;1] !
[0;1] such that p
B(pA) is the unique solution to (10) if it exists, and is equal to pA otherwise.
Clearly, a necessary condition for project B to be put to trial before project A is that there
exists belief pA such that p
B(pA) < pA. This occurs whenever, for xed pA, there exits pB




BG+r . To this end, consider the mapping pB 7!
pBG (k+k)
pBG+r . It is
straightforward to verify that this mapping is increasing and concave. Hence, for xed pA, the
inequality uA(pA) 
pBG (k+k)












G   (k + k)
G + r
> 0: (11)
That is, as the probability that project A is of type Good approaches 1, the payo to a single
risky project with cost k approaches the payo to a project known to be of type Good with cost
k and success rate G. This dominates the payo to a project known to be of type Good with
cost k + k and success rate G. In other words, the experimenter has a strict incentive to discard















That is, as pA approaches the quitting belief
k+k
G (for a risky project with cost k +k), the payo
to a project known to be of type Good with cost k + k and success rate pAG approaches 0,
while the payo to a risky project with cost k is strictly positive, since its own quitting belief
is k
G. That is, contrary to the results of Proposition 1, the experimenter will never reach the
quitting belief
k+k




G ), the experimenter has
a strict incentive to discard only a single project. (11) shows that belief (1;1) must lie outside




G ). Thus, if project B is




G ) and (1;1).
The simple necessary condition from above for the optimality of a culling phase, that there
exits a belief pA such that p
B(pA) < pA, is also sucient to guarantee the existence of a set
16of beliefs with positive Lebesgue measure in which project B is put to trial before project A.
The following proposition contains the main result of the paper, that not only does the optimal
management of options take the form of a culling rule, but that such a rule is indeed optimal
whenever it is not the case that maintenance costs are so high that the losing project is always
immediately discarded.
Proposition 2. One of the two following cases must obtain. Either
i. uA(pA) >
pAG (k+k)
pAG+r > 0 for all pA, and for almost all (pA;pB), '(pA;pB) = (1;0), or
ii. there exist pA > p
A such that uA(pA) 
pAG (k+k)
pAG+r if and only if pA 2 [p
A;pA]. Then for
almost all (pA;pB) with '(pA;pB) = (1;1), (pA;pB) = 0 only if pA 2 [p
A;pA] and pB 2
[p
B(pA);pA]. Furthermore, the set f(pA;pB) : '(pA;pB) = (1;1) and (pA;pB) = 0g has
positive Lebesgue measure.
Figure 3 illustrates the discarding boundary when the condition of part ii of Proposition 2
obtains. Dene
PM = f(pA;pB) : pA  pB;pB  p
B(pA)g;
which is the set of beliefs which is inside the discarding boundary. That is, PM is the maintenance
region, the set of beliefs inside which project B is never discarded. Further dene
PD = f(pA;pB) : pA  pBg n PM;
which is the set of beliefs outside the discarding boundary. This is the discarding region, in which
project B can be discarded immediately or maintained but never put to trial. It is easily veried
that the boundary separating PM from PD is concave. From state (pA;pB), if it is optimal to
experiment with project B, then B must be put to trial until (pA;p
B(pA)), after which B is
discarded and A must be used until p
A = k
G, the quitting belief with a single risky project.
Part ii of Proposition 2 states that there exist beliefs for which a culling rule for project B
is optimal whenever project B is not always immediately discarded. The set PB in Figure 3
illustrates the beliefs for which the argument in the proof applies, which are those beliefs close
to (p
A;p
A) and (pA;pA), the boundary beliefs of PM on the 45-degree line. For any beliefs
(pA;pB), the payo to putting project A on trial (or to shared experimentation) and maintaining
B is at most the payo to using a project known to be of type Good with success rate pAG
and experimentation cost k + k. However, near (pA;pA), discarding project B yields a payo
close to the payo to a project known to be of type Good with success rate pAG but reduced
experimentation cost k. Hence near (pA;pA), discarding project B yields strictly higher payos
than either using project A (or shared experimentation). Yet, for beliefs strictly inside PM, using

































Figure 3: Discarding Boundary.
argument applies around (p
A;p
A). Intuitively, around (pA;pA) and (p
A;p
A), the experimenter
has already decided that it no longer wishes to maintain both projects in the long term. If a
single project is to be maintained it should be project A. However, the option represented by
project B has enough value that the experimenter wants to exploit it before discarding it, which
means that project B must take precedence over project A.
4.3 Optimal Experimentation Policy
Lemmas 1 and 2 pin down the possible dynamics of trial allocations among projects. Given
pA(0) > pB(0), either i) project B is discarded immediately, ii) project B is put to trial until
it is discarded in favour of project A or iii) project A is put to trial until either a switch to
B occurs and B is put to trial until it is discarded, or belief pA(t) drops to pB(0), which leads
to shared experimentation. By Proposition 2, a period of shared experimentation is always
followed by a culling period for project B. In this nal section, I complete the characterisation
of optimal experimentation by showing when it entails these various patterns. The arguments
involve backward induction from the possible endpoints of experimentation dynamics.
A useful starting point is to focus on beliefs on the 45-degree line. Lemma 2 shows that
if pA = pB, then either there is shared experimentation or project B enters a culling period.
The next lemma addresses the question of how many exit points from shared experimentation
to project B can co-exist and shows that only a single belief (p;p) can satisfy both the value-
18matching and smooth-pasting conditions associated to such an exit.
Lemma 3. Suppose there exists p0 < p00 such that (p;p) = 1
2 for almost all p 2 [p0;p00]. Then
there exists p and p such that p  p0, p00  p and (p;p) = 1
2 for almost all p 2 P if and only if
P  [p;p].
For some p > p
A, let vAB(p;CAB(p
A)) be the payo to shared experimentation at (p;p), with
constant of integration CAB(p) capturing the eect on payos of moving to project B at belief
(p
A;p
A).14 Lemma 3 implies that if the belief p, which is derived explicitly in the Appendix, is
such that p 2 (p
A;pA) and if vAB(p;CAB(p)) > vB(p;CB(p)) for a set of beliefs (p;p) such that
p 2 (p;p + ] for some  > 0, then there exists p 2 (p;pA) such that (p;p) = 1
2 for almost all
p 2 (p;p) and (p;p) = 0 for almost all p 2 [p
A;p] [ [p;pA]. That is, optimal experimentation
calls for shared experimentation only for those beliefs (p;p) with p 2 (p;p). Of course, the set of
beliefs for which shared experimentation is optimal can be empty.
This simple characterisation of shared experimentation allows the denition of two sets of
beliefs, PB  PM and PA, which will correspond the the regions of the state space in which
projects A and B are used under optimal experimentation. The details, which follow from a
backwards induction argument, are left to the Appendix.
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0 if (pA;pB) 2 PB,
1 if (pA;pB) 2 PA,
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1 if pB  k
G,
0 otherwise.
Figure 4 provides an illustration of the sets PA and PB. The gure as drawn assumes that
PA is convex, which need not necessarily be the case. However, note that the boundary between
sets PA and PB must always be downward-sloping, else this would violate Lemma 2.



































Figure 4: Optimal Experimentation Policy.
When shared experimentation occurs on the 45-degree line, which by continuity implies that
PA is nonempty, the reversal of the `stay-with-the-winner' property exhibits a noteworthy non-
monotonicity: for xed pB, `going-with-the-loser' is optimal only if pA is neither too high nor
too low. To see this, x p0
B such that there exist p0
A > p00
A such that putting project B to trial
is optimal in state (p0
A;pB) and experimenting with project A until shared experimentation is
optimal at (p00
A;pB). If pA is much larger than p0
A, that is, if project A is believed to be of type
Good and hence to succeed quickly with high probability, then it is best for the experimenter to
discard project B immediately and exploit project A. `Going-with-the-loser' is optimal only for
intermediate beliefs pA that include p0
A and are no lower than p00
A. In these cases project A still
has a clear advantage over project B. Optimal experimentation in the absence of maintenance
costs would put project A to trial until its belief dropped to pB, after which experimentation
would be shared. However, project A is both (i) not thought likely to succeed fast enough to
dwarf the option value of project B but (ii) of sucient quality that paying to maintain the
option value of project B is too costly, since this value can be realised only after project A has
failed for a long time. If instead pA is between p00
A and pB, and hence beliefs pA and pB are close
to each other, it is still be optimal to order project development projects as though there were
no maintenance costs. In this case, both discarding project B immediately or giving it its `last
chance' is too costly, since the realisation of its option value is not so far away and project A is
not the clear-cut superior project.
205 Extensions
5.1 A Culling Rule with More than Two Risky Projects
While the characterisation of the optimal experimentation policy becomes more involved, no new
conceptual diculties arise if the experimenter has more than two risky projects. The key is that
experimentation dynamics following the choice of a non-winning project are qualitatively similar
to those uncovered by Lemma 2 for the two-project case. Consider the case in which there are
three risky projects, A, B and C, with pA  pB  pC. Generalising the argument to the case
in which there are even more risky projects is straightforward. The following result extends the
culling rule to the three-project environment by showing that if it is ever optimal to experiment
with the `middle' project B, then experimentation can proceed to the winning project A only
after both non-winning projects B and C have been discarded. That is, the `last chance' extended
by the experimenter applies not only to project B but to all projects ranked lower than B. That
is, optimal experimentation will either put the winning project to trial or enter a targeted culling
phase in which it puts to trial and then discards all suciently poor projects.
Proposition 4. Consider (pA(0);pB(0);pC(0)) and the belief path (pA(t);pB(t);pC(t))t under
optimal experimentation. Suppose that there exists ^ t > 0 such that (pA(t);pB(t);pC(t)) = (0;1)
and '(pA(t);pB(t);pC(t)) = (1;1;1) for almost all t 2 [0;^ t). Then there exists t > ^ t such that (i)
(pA(t);pB(t);pC(t)) 6= (1;0) and '(pA(t);pB(t);pC(t)) 2 f(1;1;1);(1;1;0)g for almost all t 2
[^ t;t), while (ii) (pA(t);pB(t);pC(t)) = (1;0) and '(pA(t);pB(t);pC(t)) 2 f(1;0;0);(0;0;0)g
for almost all t > t.
Proposition 4 and with my characterisation of the two-project case could lead, through an
induction argument, to a full, although tedious, characterisation of optimal experimentation with
three (and then more) projects.
5.2 Complementary Projects
I have assumed that the outcomes of the projects are perfect substitutes in that the experimenter
cares only about success on a single project. An alternative assumption is that success on a given
project retires that project but the experimenter obtains a payo of 1 from all projects that
succeed. This section shows that the result of Proposition 2, that the set of beliefs for which it is
optimal to `go-with-the-loser' is non-negligible, continues to hold with complementary projects.
Clearly, Lemmas 1 and 2 can be derived in this version of the model. It is straighforward to show
that the optimal payo in a region in which project A is put to trial and project B is maintained
must follow the following version of (6)
uA(pA;pB)[r + pAG] + u0
A(pA;pB)GpA(1   pA) = pAG[1 + uB(pB)]   (k + k): (13)
21By replicating the arguments of Section 4.2, the relevant version of (10) , which determines the
discarding boundary, can be shown to be
uA(pA) =
p




Since uA(pA) > 0 whenever project A is maintained, (14) show that the discarding region PD
is larger when projects are complimentary. Intuitively, holding on to project B longer is advan-
tageous when sucesses can be accumulated. One dierence with the discarding boundary (10)
when projects are perfect substitutes is that, again intuitively, project B need not be discarded














G in the maintenance region PM.
In other words, complementary projects can eliminate the incentive to `go-with-the-loser' when
the experimenter is optimistic about both projects, but `going-with-the-loser' always benets an
experimenter that is suciently pessimistic about both projects. This allows the application of
the argument in the proof of Proposition 2. That is, when discarding project B in favour of
project A, the experimenter is guaranteed the payo to a project known to be of type Good that
succeeds at rate p
BG[1+uA(pA)]. Meanwhile, the experimenter's payo from experimenting with
project A and maintaining project B yields stricly less than the payo to a project known to be
of type Good that succeeds at rate pAG[1+uB(pB)]. The result of Proposition 2 then applies for
p




The standard approach to experimentation has been to assume that when currently occupied by
other projects, keeping the option of researching various alternatives at later dates is costless.
However, that keeping options open can involve maintenance costs is natural in many settings.
This paper shows that such costs generate new trade-os for experimenters by giving them
incentives to manage the timing of the realisation of inactive alternatives' option values and have
important implications for optimal experimentation policies.
While I have focused on the simple and tractable exponential bandit problem, it is not un-
reasonable to expect that my main arguments extend to more general bandit settings. Note
that more generally, the arguments used in the paper are based on nite backwards induction,
where the recursion is on the set of maintained projects. At each step of the recursion, the argu-
ments rely on maintained projects' Gittins indices. This is made clear by the common structure
of Lemmas 1 and 2 and the original `interchange argument' of Gittins (1979) that establishes
22the optimality of index policies in standard bandit problems. Investigating the relationship be-
tween the idea of maintenance costs and general bandits is an interesting avenue for future work.
This could in turn allow the model to address economic applications other than research and
development, which is particularly well captured by the exponential bandit framework.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that pA(0) > pB(0), and consider the belief path under optimal
experimentation (pA(t);pB(t))t. The rst step is to show that if there exists ^ t > 0 and ^ T 
[0;^ t) such that ^ T has positive Lebesgue measure and (pA(t);pB(t)) 6= 1 for all t 2 ^ T, then
(pA(t);pB(t)) = 0 for almost all t 2 ^ T. Suppose instead that (pA(t);pB(t)) = (t) 2 (0;1)
for all t 2 ^ T. Let TA =
R ^ t
0 (t)dt. By assumption, TA 2 (0;^ t).
Given allocation (t) for t 2 [0;^ t), and initial beliefs (pA(0);pB(0)), solving the dierential















24Belief pA(t) depends only on the cumulative experimentation on project A up to time t,
R t
0 (s)ds,
and not on when this experimentation occurred within the interval [0;t].





1 for all t 2 (0;^ t   TA],
0 for all t 2 (^ t   TA;^ t),
with ^  =  otherwise. Then (^ pA(^ t); ^ pB(^ t)) = (pA(^ t);pB(^ t)), where (^ pA(t); ^ pB(t))t is the belief
path associated with ^ . Hence, the payos following ^ t are the same under both assignments.
That is, v(^ ;';pA(^ t);pB(^ t)) = u(pA(^ t);pB(^ t)). Furthermore, conditional on (pA(0);pB(0)), the
probability that no success occurs until ^ t is the same under  and ^ .
Let  (respectively ^ ) be the random arrival time of a success under assignment  (re-
spectively ^ ) in time interval [0;^ t]. Then Pr[^   tjpA(0);pB(0)] > Pr[  tjpA(0);pB(0)] for
all t 2 (0;^ t), that is, ^  is higher than  in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance. By
discounting, the experimenter's payo is decreasing in the arrival time of a success, and hence ^ 
yields a strictly higher expected payo than  in [0;^ t], or
Z ^ t
0
[1   (k + k)]e
 r^ ^ (d^ ) >
Z ^ t
0
[1   (k + k)]e r(d);
where ^  and  are the distributions of ^  and , respectively. Hence,
v(^ ;pA(^ t);pB(^ t)) =
Z ^ t
0
[1   (k + k)]e




[1   (k + k)]e r(d) + Pr[ > ^ tjpA(0);pB(0))u(pA(^ t);pB(^ t)]
= u(pA(0);pB(0));
a contradiction. Hence it must be that (t) = 0 for almost all t 2 [0;^ t].
That is, the previous argument shows that if project A is not used, it must be that project
B is used exclusively. Since in that case pA(t) > pB(t) for all t > 0, the previous argument also
ensures that project B is used until experimentation ceases, which must occur at time t such
that pB(t) =
k+k
G . By mimicking this strategy with project A instead of B, that is, using project
A until belief p
A =
k+k
G and then moving permanently to S, the experimenter's payo at time 0













a contradiction. CA is the constant of integration for the optimal stopping problem with a
single risky project and direct cost k + k. Hence, it must be that (t) = 1 for all t such that
pA(t) > pB(t).
The same argument can be applied if pA(0) = pB(0) to show that experimentation is shared
until it ceases, i.e., (pA(t);pB(t)) = 1
2 for all t such that '(pA(t);pB(t)).
Proof of Proposition 1. To obtain an expression for optimal payos under shared experimenta-
tion, note that under the assumption that pA = pB = p and that (p;p) = 1
2 for all beliefs
p greater than some quiting belief p, the optimal payo u must satisfy @
@pAu = @
@pBu. Dene
uAB(p)  u(p;p), then it follows that u0
AB(p) = 2 @
@pAu(p;p) and uAB solves





The dierential equation (15) has solution
















If optimal experimentation leads from shared experimentation to the safe project at belief p, the
constant of integration ~ CAB and cuto belief p =
k+k
G are determined by value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions.
uAB(p) = 0, and
u0
AB(p) = 0:
What remains to be shown in the text is that the Markov strategy (
ND;
ND) is admissible
and that the value function w(pA;pB) inferred from strategy (
ND;




0; pAG   (k + k)  
@u(pA;pB)
@pA
GpA(1   pA)   u(pA;pB)GpA;
pBG   (k + k)  
@u(pA;pB)
@pB
GpB(1   pB)   u(pA;pB)GpB
)
: (16)





1 if t < t,
1
2 if t 2 [t;t),





(1;1) if t < t0,
(0;0) if t  t0,
(17)
is admissible. Furthermore, given any (pA;pB), there exist t, t and t0 such that 0  t  t







and hence Markov strategy (
ND;'
ND) is admissible.
Let w(pA;pB) be the value function inferred from strategy (
ND;
ND). Consider state









(1   pA) + pA
G   (k + k)
r + G




with the constant of integration determined at the switch to shared experimentation when pA =
pB. It is easy to see that w(pA;pB) > w(pB;pB) > 0, and hence it is optimal to continue
experimentation for all pA > pB. The derivative of the third term of (16) with respect to pA is
  @
@pAw(pA;pB)GpB < 0. Since w(pA;pB) is increasing in pA, so is the second term of (16). If










0 (by smooth-pasting since at (pB;pB) a transition occurs to shared experimentation). Hence,
the second term of (16) is larger than the third term for all pA > pB, as required. For (pA;pB)
such that pA >
k+k
G > pB, then w(pA;pB) = uA(pA), while for (pA;pB) such that pA = pB >
k+k
G ,
w(pA;pB) = uAB(pA). In both these cases, it is easy to see that value-matching and smooth-
pasting imply that w(pA;pB) > 0 whenever pA >
k+k
G , as desired.
Proof of Lemma 2. For part i, suppose there exists ^ t and  > 0 such that '(pA(t);pB(t)) 6= (1;1)
and (pA(t);pB(t)) 6= S for almost all t 2 [^ t;^ t + ). Then one project is discarded on the
equilibrium path. Let t = infft < ^ t : '(pA(t);pB(t)) 6= (1;1)g. If '(pA(t);pB(t)) = (0;1),
then since (pA(t);pB(t)) 6= S for almost all t 2 [^ t;^ t+), it must be that (pA(t);pB(t)) = 0
27for almost all t 2 [^ t;^ t + ). Consider a Markov strategy (0;'0) such that
'0(pA;pB) = (1;0) for all (pA;pB) such that '(pA;pB) = (0;1),
0(pA(t);pB(t)) = 1 for all t > t for which (pA(t);pB(t)) = 0,
with (0;'0) = (;') otherwise. Under (0;'0), p0
A(t)  pB(t) for all t > t by the assumption
of symmetric strategies, and hence for all t > t such that (pA(t);pB(t)) = 0,
v(0;'0;pA(t);pB(t)) = vA(pA(t); ~ CA)
 vB(pB(t); ~ CA)
= vB(pB(t); ~ CB)
= u(pA(t);pB(t)):
If the inequality is strict, this yields the required contradiction, while if it holds with equality, it
is without loss of generality to discard project B instead of project A.
For part ii, suppose that there exists ^ t such that (pA(t);pB(t)) = 1 for almost all t 2 [0;^ t)
and that there exists t0 < ^ t such that '(pA(t);pB(t)) = (1;1) for almost all t 2 [0;t0), but that
'(pA(t00);pB(t00)) 6= (1;1) for some t00 2 (t0;^ t). By part i, '(pA(t00);pB(t00)) = (1;0). Consider
Markov strategy (0;'0) such that '0(pA(0);pB(0)) = (1;0), with (0;'0) = (;') otherwise.











where the constants of integration CA and C0





A = CA  
pA(t00)
k





































28The inequality follows since pA(t00) < pA(0).
Proof of Lemma 2. Lemma 1 and part i of Lemma 2 imply that if there exists ^ t > 0 such that
(pA(t);pB(t)) 6= 1 for almost all t 2 [0;^ t) and '(pA(t);pB(t)) = (1;1) for all t 2 [0;^ t), then
it must be that (pA(t);pB(t)) = 0 for almost all t 2 [0;^ t) and that if there exists t  ^ t
such that (pA(t);pB(t)) > 0, then by part i of Lemma 2 it must be that '(pA(t);pB(t)) 2
f(1;0);(0;0)g. That is, if project A is not pulled it must be that project B is, and the experimenter
cannot go back to project A without discarding project B. Since the experimenter must eventually
discard B if pB gets close to 0, it only remains to be shown that '(pA(t);pB(t)) = (1;0), that
is, that the experimenter will discard B in favour of A at t. This follows by part ii of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, uA(pA) is increasing and convex in pA. Also, since the mapping
pA 7!
pAG (k+k)
pAG+r is increasing and concave, then by (11) and (12) either uA(pA) >
pAG (k+k)
pAG+r > 0
for all pA or there exist pA > p
A such that uA(pA) 
pAG (k+k)
pAG+r if and only if pA 2 [p
A;pA],
where p
A and pA are the only two solutions to uA(pA) =
pAG (k+k)
pAG+r .
Now suppose that the conditions of part ii obtain. A rst claim is that at (pA;pA), discarding
project B is strictly preferred to shared experimentation. By Lemma 2, if B is not discarded
then (pA;pA) = 1
2 and the beliefs go down the 45-degree line until some belief (p;p), and
hence the experimenter's payos satisfy u(pA;pB) = vAB(pA;CAB(p)). vAB itself satises
vAB(pA;CAB(p)) =








pAG   (k + k)
(r + pAG)
= vA(pA; ~ CA):
Hence, by continuity, for states (p;p) with p < pA suciently close to pA, discarding B is strictly
preferred to shared experimentation. A very similar argument shows that discarding B is strictly
preferred to using project A for an open set of states of positive Lebesgue measure (pA;pB) with
pA > pB suciently close to (pA;pA). However, within the discarding boundary using project B
(until the boundary) is preferred to discarding it and hence there exists an open region of positive
Lebesgue measure around (pA;pA) in which using project B is optimal. A very similar argument
demonstrates the same result for a region around (p
A;p
A).
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 2, once the experimenter quits shared experimentation, project
B is used, then discarded and replaced with project A. Also, by Proposition 2, there exists a
belief ^ p > p
A such that (p;p) = 0 for almost all p 2 [p
A; ^ p]. Suppose there exists p0 > p00
29such that (p;p) = 1
2 for almost all p 2 [p0;p00], and that the experimenter switches from shared





















































Meanwhile, the value matching condition is
vAB(p;CAB(p)) = vB(p;CB(p));







G (1   p)
 
G2






r(r + G)(r + G
2 )
:
Together, these yield that
p =
2(k + k)(r + G)(r + G
2 )
2(k + k)(r + G)(r + G
2 ) + G2
2 (k + k + r)
(18)
Clearly, p 2 [0;1] is unique. Dene p to be the unique solution to (18).
Proof of Proposition 3. First, I construct the sets PB and PA. In the following, assume that
the conditions of Lemma 3 are met and that there exists a (unique) portion of the 45-degree
line (p;p) for which shared experimentation is optimal. The arguments that follow apply in a









30By Lemma 2, it must be that given p 2 [p
A;p][[p;pA], (p;pB) = 0 for almost all pB 2 (p;p
B(p)).










the set of beliefs in the maintenance region that have not been attributed to P1
B. By Lemma
2, from such beliefs, an optimal policy will either put project B to trial immediately until it
is discarded, or put project A to trial either until beliefs reach the 45-degree or until a switch
to project B occurs. Dene vA(pA;CA(pB;p0
A)) to be the payo to the experimenter in state
(pA;pB) 2 PM n P1
B were it to put project A to trial until belief p0
A 2 [maxfpB;pg;pA), and
then switch to project B until discarding belief p
B(p0
A). Hence the constant of integration
CA(pB;p0
A) depends on the belief pB and on the switching belief p0
A, but not on pA. Simi-
larly, if pB > p, dene vA(pA;C45
A (pB)) to be the payo to the experimenter in state (pA;pB)
were it to put project A to trial until it reaches the 45-degree line, after which it shares ex-
perimentation until joint belief p. If pB  p, then dene vA(pA;C45
A (pB)) = vA(pA;CA(pB;p)).
Note that vA(pA;CA(pB;p0
A))  vA(pA;CA(pB;p00





A (pB)) if and only if CA(pB;p0
A)  C45
A (pB). Hence if
CA(pB;pA) = maxfp0
A2[maxfpB;pg;pA]g CA(pB;p0
A), then the experimenter has no incentive to put
project A to trial. If, on the other hand, there exists a p0
A such that CA(pB;p0
A) > CA(pB;pA),
















and let PB = P1
B [ P2
B. Finally, let P1
A = PM n PB. Hence, all the beliefs in PM have been
attributed either to PB or to P1
A.
Third, consider the beliefs in PD, those outside the discarding boundary. By Lemma 2,
it must be that '(pA;pB) = (1;0) for all (pA;pB) 2 PD that are not in the set f(pA;pB) :
(pA;pB(pA)) = 1g. That is, if project B is maintained, it must be that it will not be discarded
once beliefs reach the discarding boundary. Let
Q =
n





That is, Q is the set of beliefs in the discarding region such that were A to be used and B
maintained until the discarding bound, B would also be maintained when beliefs cross into PM.
For any (pA;pB) 2 Q, dene p





(pA;pB) 2 Q : vA(pA;CA(pB;p
A (pB)) > vA(pA; ~ CA)
o
:
Finally, let PA = P1
A [ P2
A.
31What remains is to show that the strategy (;') is admissible and that the value function
w(pA;pB) inferred from strategy (;) solves the Bellman equation for the experimenter's
problem. Both of these follow from an argument very similar to that for Proposition 1. In this
case, however, verication of the optimality of (;') is more tedious, and is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider (pA(0);pB(0);pC(0)) and the belief path (pA(t);pB(t);pC(t))t
under optimal experimentation. Suppose that there exists ^ t > 0 such that (pA(t);pB(t);pC(t)) =
(0;1) and '(pA(t);pB(t);pC(t)) = (1;1;1) for almost all t 2 [0;^ t). By Lemma 2, if project C
is ever put to trial, then it is on trial continuously until it is discarded. Hence the statement of






2 such that (pA(t);pB(t);pC(t)) = 2




2 ), (pA(t);pB(t);pC(t)) = (1;0) for almost all
t 2 (t00
1;t00







Then an argument along the lines of that of Lemma 1 yields that reordering the assignment by
experimenting with project A exclusively earlier increases the experimenter's payo, yielding the
required contradiction.
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